Black And Reich

I guess it's because I was using TurboTax to work on my income tax return for the past few days, that I was constantly reminded of Treasury Secretary "Turbo" Tim Geithner.  Criticism continues to abound concerning the plan by Turbo Tim and Larry Summers for getting the infamous "toxic assets" off the balance sheets of our nation's banks.  It's known as the Public-Private Investment Program (a/k/a:  PPIP or "pee-pip").  I recently read an article by a couple of Economics professors named Laurence J. Kotlikoff (Boston University) and Jeffrey Sachs (Columbia University) wherein they referred to this plan as the GASP (Geithner And Summers Plan).  Their bottom line:

The Geithner-and-Summers Plan should be scrapped.  President Obama should ask his advisors to canvas the economics and legal community to hear the much better ideas that are in wide circulation.

One of the harshest critics of the PPIP is William Black, an Economics professor at the University of Missouri.  Professor Black gained recognition during the 1980s while he was deputy director of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).  During that time, the FSLIC helped block an attempted sale of Charles Keating's Lincoln Savings and Loan, which was subsequently seized by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, despite opposition from five United States Senators, who became known as the Keating Five.  A recent interview with Professor Black by Jack Willoughby of Barrons revealed that Black's aversion to the PPIP starts with the fact that it is being implemented by Geithner and Summers:

We have failed bankers giving advice to failed regulators on how to deal with failed assets. How can it result in anything but failure?  If they are going to get any truthful investigation, the Democrats picked the wrong financial team. Tim Geithner, the current Secretary of the Treasury, and Larry Summers, chairman of the National Economic Council, were important architects of the problems. Geithner especially represents a failed regulator, having presided over the bailouts of major New York banks.

I particularly enjoyed Black's characterization of the PPIP's use of government (i.e. taxpayer) money to back private purchases of the toxic assets:

It is worse than a lie. Geithner has appropriated the language of his critics and of the forthright to support dishonesty. That is what's so appalling -- numbering himself among those who convey tough medicine when he is really pandering to the interests of a select group of banks who are on a first-name basis with Washington politicians.


The current law mandates prompt corrective action, which means speedy resolution of insolvencies. He is flouting the law, in naked violation, in order to pursue the kind of favoritism that the law was designed to prevent.  He has introduced the concept of capital insurance, essentially turning the U.S. taxpayer into the sucker who is going to pay for everything.  He chose this path because he knew Congress would never authorize a bailout based on crony capitalism.

For the past month or so, I've been hearing many stock market commentators bemoan the fact that there is so much money "on the sidelines".  In other words, people with trading accounts are letting their money sit in brokerage money market accounts, rather than risking it in the stock markets.  I believe that many of these people are so discouraged by the sleazy environment on Wall Street, they are waiting for things to get cleaned up before they take any more chances in a casino where so many games are rigged.  In the Barrons interview, Black made a point that reinforced my opinion: 

His (Geithner's) use of language like "legacy assets" -- and channeling the worst aspects of Milton Friedman -- is positively Orwellian. Extreme conservatives wrongly assume that the government can't do anything right. And they wrongly assume that the market will ultimately lead to correct actions. If cheaters prosper, cheaters will dominate. It is like Gresham's law: Bad money drives out the good. Well, bad behavior drives out good behavior, without good enforcement.

By asking Professor Black a few simple, straightforward questions (in layperson's language) Jack Willoughby got some fantastic and refreshing information in return (also in layperson's language) making this article a "must read".  As Black and many others have pointed out, these huge financial institutions must be broken down into smaller businesses.  Why isn't this being undertaken?  Professor Black looks to where the buck stops:

Obama, who is doing so well in so many other arenas, appears to be slipping because he trusts Democrats high in the party structure too much.


These Democrats want to maintain America's pre-eminence in global financial capitalism at any cost. They remain wedded to the bad idea of bigness, the so-called financial supermarket -- one-stop shopping for all customers -- that has allowed the American financial system to paper the world with subprime debt. Even the managers of these worldwide financial conglomerates testify that they have become so sprawling as to be unmanageable.

Another critic of the Geithner-Summers PPIP is former Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich.  Reich is now a professor at the University of California at Berkeley.  His April 6 blog entry discussed the fact that the top 25 hedge fund managers earned a total of $11.6 billion last year:

But what causes me severe heartburn is that these are exactly the sort of investors Tim Geithner is trying to lure in to buy troubled assets from banks, with an extraordinary offer financed by you and me and other taxpayers: If it turns out the troubled assets are worth more than these guys pay for them, they could make a fortune. If it turns out the assets are worth less, these guys won't lose a thing because we taxpayers will bail them out. Plus, they get to pick only the highest-rated of the big banks' bad assets and can review them carefully before buying.

 

What a deal. Why can't you and I get in on this bonanza? Because we're too small. The government will designate only about five big investor funds -- run or owned by the richest of the rich -- as potential buyers. Hedge funds fit the bill perfectly. 

It's nice to know that more and more prominent individuals in the world of economics and public policy are taking the ethical stand against a program based on the principle of "socialized loss and privatized gain".  I just hope President Obama doesn't take too long to realize that these people are right and that the Geithner - Summers team is wrong.

thecenterlane.com

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  • 4/19/2009 4:33 PM Bill Bradbrooke wrote:
    Your article is a re-hash with no insights whatsoever as how the goals you advocate can be accomplished. In the absense of clear proof of insolvency, how is it possible to nationalize "bad" banks easily? Until markets put an undisputed value on toxic assets there is no way to declare an institution insolvent and to nationalize it (eradicate shareholder equity) without a prolonged and messy Supreme Court battle over fair compensation for property taken.

    I agree wholeheartedly with Professor Black about the corrupt nature of the culture on Wall Street and the need for reform. However, if regulators were to march into even one so-called "too-big-to-fail" institution this Friday and open Monday under new management, the DOW would plunge and wouldn't stop till it hits 3000. Then what?

    If you want to be useful, you people have to think this problem through with far greater care than you have shown in this article.

    Reform must precede nationalization.

    1. There must be oversight of the financial sector to detect system-wide risks.

    2. Authority to seize and recapitalize must extend to all financial institutions.

    3. Leverage and possibly size must be limited in individual financial institutions.

    4. All synthetic securities must be registered and trade on regulated exchanges.

    5. CDSs and similar engineered financial instruments must be recognized as either securities subject to registration and trading rules or as insurance subject to reserve requirements.

    6. The uptick rule must be re-instated.

    7. Issuers of synthetic securities must retain a percentage of each offering and possibly call a market.

    8. Executive compensation of all publically traded companies must not exceed a multiple of a national average and incentives must be back-end loaded, i.e., incentives can only be paid out of gains to the client as the client receives that gain.

    With regulations such as these in place and operating, the culture on Wall Street would change going forward, toxic assets on the books today (finite in value) could be dealt with and nationalization of financial institutions, where warranted, could occur in a less contentious atmosphere. Most importantly, our economy would not be totally destroyed and the rest of the world would have a reformed US financial sector to generate capital once again for client states across the globe.

    If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem.


    Reply by John Burke:

    It's nice to know that there are some smart people reading my blog!

     

    That said, let's take a look at some of the points in this Comment:

     

    First of all, I have been advocating what the smarter experts (Krugman, Stiglitz, Roubini et al.) have been talking about:  putting the insolvent banks into temporary receivership (often referred to as "nationalization", which it is not).  I didn’t want to “re-hash” that point from so many of my earlier postings.

     

    Next Comment point:

    Until markets put an undisputed value on toxic assets there is no way to declare an institution insolvent and to nationalize it (eradicate shareholder equity) without a prolonged and messy Supreme Court battle over fair compensation for property taken.

    "An UNDISPUTED value on toxic assets"?  There will always be disputes, but the fact is they are what Paul Krugman calls them:  Trash.

    In fact, the FDIC puts smaller banks through temporary receivership all the time.  It's just that the big banks are used to "lobbying" their way out of trouble, so they shouldn't have to suffer the same fate as smaller institutions. 

    "Fair compensation for property taken"?  The property is worthless.  Any nimrod who buys or holds BankUnited stock at 29 cents per share is gambling that he or she will make a windfall from the next bailout (whether through PPIP or any other scenario, at the taxpayers' expense).  "You pays your money and you takes your chances."  The stakeholders involved here are well-funded and can be expected to put up a court fight, but they will lose.  Their sense of personal specialness is not justified by any legal precedent.

     

    Next Comment point:

    However, if regulators were to march into even one so-called "too-big-to-fail" institution this Friday and open Monday under new management, the DOW would plunge and wouldn't stop till it hits 3000. Then what?

    No scenario could be worse than the situation where Goldman Sachs (OOPS! -- I mean their former CEO, Hank Paulson) forced Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy.  If the Dow didn't drop to 3000 at that point, it certainly won't drop that far when the government intervenes to clear the toxic assets off a big bank's balance sheet.

     

    The suggested reforms in the Comment are well-reasoned.  They are exactly the sort of measures necessary to bring investors back from the sidelines (as my posting discussed).  The "seize and recapitalize" theme of point #2 is important:  seize first and recapitalize later.  Let's not keep bailing out zombie banks unless their management is replaced and some useful reorganization is implemented.

     

    As for the Uptick Rule, although I don't oppose it, there is a serious debate as to whether it will do any good.  It might be more important to take another look at naked short-selling.  Shorting puts selling pressure on a stock, which may be well-deserved.  However, naked short-selling has the effect of temporarily creating "counterfeit" shares that dilute the value of the legitimate shares.  That effect has a synergistic impact when combined with the normal selling pressure that shorting facilitates. 

     

    Thanks for your contribution!


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